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Returning in January, with Donald Trump’s campaign vows to end the war in Ukraine in under 24 hours” remaining vivid in memory, there was real unease in Moscow over Trump’s intentions. After Mr. Trump suggested that significant levels of Taxes, Tariffs, and Sanctions” on Russia might be necessary, one well-known hawkish Russian analyst wrote: “It’s better to prepare for the worst. Before long, we’ll look back on the previous term with nostalgia, like a thaw.”

Unfulfilled Threats and Failed Opportunities

Just how wrong was that view? Since then, the American leader has consistently spoken a big game without coming close to walking the walk. By May, when Vladimir Putin rejected a 30-day ceasefire, and peace talks in Turkey stalled, a devastating” US penalties package did not to materialise. An 8 August cut-off for Mr Putin to agree to a halt in fighting inexplicably turned into a lavish welcome in Alaska, where Mr Trump praised a leader wanted for atrocities as he disembarked from his plane. The “severe consequences” warned of by Mr Trump should the Alaska talks did not lead to peace never happened.

Emboldened Actions and Allied Vulnerabilities

Empowered, Mr Putin has accordingly continued to prosecute his war objectives in Ukraine, and probe for Nato weaknesses. Last week’s incursion of Russian drones into Polish territory laid bare inadequate Nato planning, as F-35 and F-16 fighter jets were quickly dispatched to deal with low-cost suicide devices that are priced around $ten thousand each to produce. It also sent a message of possible escalation in the event of any future “deterrence force” deploying European troops on Ukrainian soil. Such provocation called for a robust and unified response, exerting the kind of pressure on the Kremlin which Mr Trump has so far refused to countenance. Instead the US president seems, yet again, to prefer pressuring his European allies to targeting Mr Putin. In a statement which reeked of bad faith, Mr Trump stated over the weekend that the US was “prepared” to impose tougher sanctions on Russia, but only if certain unlikely conditions were met.

Impractical Requirements and Economic Leverage

Aiming for a considerable economic prize, Washington is demanding that the EU must increase its imports of US liquified natural gas at a rate that analysts judge unachievable. Other demands include the application by the EU of 50%-100% tariffs on Russia’s most important ally, China, and an end to all imports of Russian oil by Nato members. This includes Turkey, which has refused to sanction Moscow, imports 57% of its oil from Russia, and lies outside the EU.

Observers looking on the bright side in Brussels hope that Mr Trump’s pressure may convince pro-Trump governments in Hungary and Slovakia to end their deep dependence on Russian energy imports. That is extremely unlikely to happen, as Mr Trump and his advisers must know. Nor can the EU afford to court the kind of economic response from Beijing that caused Mr Trump himself to back down from a full-blown trade war recently.

Concerning Events and Absence of Action

Throughout this week’s state visit, it will be Sir Keir Starmer’s turn to try to press Mr Trump down on decisive action. But from the unproductive Alaska talks to his latest distracting tactics with the EU, Mr Trump keeps finding reasons not to get tough on Russia. Last week’s drone incursion in Poland represented an ominous upping of the ante. Ukraine’s prospects, and wider European security interests, are being gradually undermined by a president who, in this context, barks but never acts.